Speech-act-theoretic explanations of problems of pure indexicals

According to Kaplan (1989), the characters of pure indexicals, *I, here* and *now*, determine the content of each of their tokens to be the speaker, the location of utterance, and the time of utterance, respectively, where a contextual factor is sufficient to determine the content.

This idea is questioned by Sidelle (1991). The utterance “I am not here now” is true if and only if the utterer is not at the location of utterance at the time of utterance, and, therefore, it may never be true. This conclusion is at odds with the intuition that “I am not here now” is true as an answering-machine message.

Nunberg (1993) raises another issue. He claims that *I* and singular *you* in utterances that express general propositions can contribute properties. The following utterance allows a general reading: “*I*” does not only refer to a particular speaker, but generally to the condemned prisoner.

(1) *Condemned prisoner*: I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal.

The general reading is, however, not available when a name or referentially used description is put in the place of the indexical.

One of the twofold purpose of the present talk is to address the answering-machine paradox from a speech-act-theoretic perspective (Austin [1962]1975). *I, here* and *now* do not only refer, respectively, to a particular speaker and the location/time of utterance, but also the performer (addressee) of a particular type of illocutionary act and the discursively specified time and place. The gap between a speaker and the addresser is utilized in an answering message.

The other is to explain how *I* and singular *you* refer to a property. In utterance (1), a speaker, as the addressee of the illocutionary of identifying, identifies her/himself as the condemned prisoner who is allowed to order whatever s/he likes for her/his last meal, where “*I*” refers to the speaker and the addresser of identifying, which brings about the general reading.