Implicit first person indirect reports

In this paper, I deal with implicit indirect reports. First of all, I discuss implicit indirect reports involving the first person. Then, I prove that in some cases second person reports are implicit indirect reports involving a de se attribution. Then I draw analogies with implicit indirect reports involving the third person. I establish some similarities at the level of the free enrichment through which the explicature is obtained and I propose that the explicature is syntactically active given that it sanctions anaphora.

An implicit indirect report is a report which does not explicitly display features of indirect reports (e.g. the verb ‘say’ or the presence of a reported speaker), but implies an evidential base which requires the structure of an indirect report. Most importantly, in this paper I demonstrate that such structural elements are active from a syntactic point of view in that they allow anaphora under certain conditions. Although it is the speaker’s meaning that matters in these cases, which intrudes into the explicature and requires that it has a certain (compulsory) logical form, the elements of the logical form implied at the level of the explicature are syntactically active. Furthermore, sometimes they require syntactic slots such as the experiencer and, furthermore, and surprisingly, in the case of second person reports what is implied is a structure hosting a de se implicit attribution, which allows an internal perspective. Such implicit indirect reports with de se ramifications are to be considered logophoric structures that present the perspective of someone in particular, in general the experience as linked to a time which is posterior to the event narrated in the indirect report.

The issues posed by this paper go beyond the topic as explicitly discussed, as issues are raised on the nature of the explicature and the possibility that elements of the explicature are syntactically active. Such considerations can also be extended to other types of explicatures and have to be pursued in due time.

I find it also surprising that from speaker’s intentions we can go on to reconstruct the explicature and its syntactic configuration. This is something which is normally not discussed in the literature. That the explicature should have a compulsory syntactic configuration as a result of speaker’s intentions is something novel in the literature. We assume that more than the examples we discuss in this paper can be subject to a similar analysis as most cases in which one cannot directly know another person’s mind but one has to know it through what a speaker has said potentially constitute cases to be analysed as implicit indirect reports. Even innocent remarks such as e.g. John has a pain in his stomach can be analyzed as implicit indirect reports, given that the question arises as to how we know what happens in John’s mind or body if he never told us what happens to him. Since we cannot know what he feels like telepathically, it must be reasoned that we know that some other way and, presumably, through what John has said to us about his corporeal sensations. Speaker’s intentions prevail and a deeper logical form has to be reconstructed. The Wittgensteinian idea that at least a number of utterances must have a logical form that is different from what is superficially testified by the utterance is vindicated.