Slurs can be generated from either the use of explicitly marked terms or expressions or through the illocutionary force of a speech act without the use of explicitly marked terms. We might characterize this distinction as one of *slur as lexical category* versus *slur as illocutionary act*. Much attention has been paid to theorizing the former. Several theorists have offered a range of accounts addressing the semantic and pragmatic properties of lexical slurs. My aim is to provide more attention to the other component of this distinction. That is, the motivating question animating my inquiry is, ‘What makes an utterance a slurring illocutionary act?’ We generally recognize that one can slur another employing euphemism, dysphemism, or via ostensibly neutral expressions. When utterances employing euphemism or neutral expressions slur, they do so, presumably, because they *do* something to their target. This is the hallmark of a speech act analysis; it employs mechanisms aimed at explaining the act performed by an utterance. In keeping with that spirit, I aim to construct a view that claims slurring illocutionary acts are utterances that undermine reasonable expectations of respect. Within the scope of this talk, I discuss various ways of slurring someone illocutionarily as well as the shape and nature of the sort of disrespect at the heart of slurring speech acts.